The following blog-post is a commentary on Cohen's “Pareto Argument”, from Ch. 2 of his book Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cohen himself is commenting on Brian Barry's account of the Rawlsian principle for inequality, which I shall briefly explain:
Rawls argues that through the use of a “Veil of Ignorance” members of a closed society can determine what principles of justice ought to guide distribution of essential resources. The premise is that said members have a starting point with no knowledge of their role, position, talents or heritage in this society, so they are free from personal conflict of interest or bias towards arbitrary conditions of typical asymmetries in power and wealth. From this original position of no knowledge, individuals would be prompted to establish two basic principles of justice: first, that all members gain access to an equal initial distribution of resources; second, that if there are to exist any inequalities at all, these should only be permitted if it is for the benefit of those worse off.
From the way Barry interprets Rawls, it seems the argument is that it would be irrational to maintain strict equality for the sake of equality when, if given a certain degree of inequality for the talented or fortunate, the worse off would be left in a better position than otherwise, which is a weak pareto effect. Cohen takes this account and frames it as a springboard for inequality. I would object to this perspective on Rawls, presented as if to make this misleading argument in favour of a principle of inequality, and even setting the conditions to argue in favour of a pareto superior state. This is established to uphold his own vision of justice, proposing a third dimension to egalitarian establishment:
If in D1 the talented and the unskilled have the same income, and in D2 the talented would have a proportionally greater income than the unskilled (which would make the skilled inclined to work with more effort) but the unskilled are still better off than in D1, the Rawlsian principle would allow this inequality. However, Cohen argues, if D2 exist, it is in fact possible to establish a third state in which the talented and the unskilled have a greater income than in D1 because if the talented are indeed egalitarian they should not mind working with the necessary effort for all to be better off. Hence, truly commited egalitarians ought not to worry about a pareto effect.
I would argue that the object of inequality in the system is only justified when meant to remedy an already existing condition of inequality, such as positive discrimination, affirmative action, exponential taxation on coefficient of utilities and so on. I do not believe that Rawls would base his principles of equality on a social state plagued by weak pareto schemes, much less pareto superior. In my opinion this is an oversimplified and catered understanding of Rawlsian theory in order to serve as a platform from which Cohen springs his conclusions.
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Pareto by Proxy
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4 comments:
I think it’s important to separate Cohen’s argument from hasty assumptions about what the consequences of accepting his conclusions might be.
A key plank in Cohen’s argument is the part where he suggests that if we were all really egalitarians, then we could move to D3, whereby the talented egalitarians don’t mind working for the same amount, because they are committed to equality.
It seems to me that this is more a matter of conceptual consequences than actual ‘real-world’ consequences. What Cohen seems to have shown, I think, is that Rawls has made a conceptual mistake in his account, since Rawls is assuming that everyone in his society is committed to the principles of justice, but at the same time (if we follow Cohen), that they’re not so committed as to be willing to use their talents to produce more at the same rate of pay as the less talented.
Yet even so, it’s not clear to me what necessarily follows from accepting Cohen’s criticism. Cohen has essentially gone into the Rawlsian foundations and rearranged things, but it remains to be seen whether this means that the whole house will fall down or not.
Since we’re already working with a division – Rawls’ account is meant to apply to an ideal world, and we have to work with a real one – I don’t know whether or not Cohen’s objection is so damaging as to spill over from the ideal to the real. Or is it possible, perhaps that we might choose the difference principle as a kind of ‘backup’ principal of justice? Maybe if we take Cohen’s objection on board we can say something like “yes, D3 is actually the fairest situation, but if we find ourselves in situations where it’s impossible to achieve, the difference principle should guide us in those cases as a ‘next best’ alternative”?
On a second reading of Chen I agree with Brian. All Cohen argues is that liberty concerns shouldn’t stop us from being egalitarians because if we were we wouldn’t be forced to produce at a higher level for less pay. But for me it just sidesteps the real world conundrum that we have that there will always be some people who do want to produce at a higher level for the same wage. To use a metaphor; in solving the trilemma about the chicken, a fox and some feed where the farmer must each get them to the other side of the river Cohen’s solution to me seems like he convinces the fox to go vegetarian, ie the puzzle gets turned into something it’s not. The fox will always want to eat the chicken and the libertarian will always want to more money for greater productivity. So while Cohen may have pointed out a flaw in Rawl’s reasoning he hasn’t for me solved the real world problem.
Indeed, following Rawls' own theoretical thread, it stems that in an Ideal setting, there would be no need for D2 to begin with. That is to say, a society of no inequalities.
What Cohen suggests, I believe, is yet another Ideal setting, based on the assumption that all individuals are committed egalitarians, which therefore becomes a moot argument since he was repealing Rawls' D2 - which in itself is established under the assumption that we live in a non ideal world.
Personally I find Rawls’ ‘veil of ignorance’ theory to be unsubstantiated and unrealistic. Even in a closed society individuals will always be shaped by internal and external factors that both stimulate and encourage the formation of individual thought and deduction, thus ensuring that no one is ever truly ‘ignorant’. I disagree with Rawls and do not believe that ignorance is a necessity when determining principles of social justice. If anything I believe that awareness leads to action which in turn has the ability to facilitate justice.
I agree with Brian’s logic that Rawls’ account is intended to be applied only in an ideal, initially equal world. Rawls’ theory, however, cannot be implemented as we live in a world where inequalities exist. ‘Strict equality for the sake of equality’ simply cannot be maintained as this, inevitably, will only lead to further inequality in an already unequal word.
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