Following the reading of chapters 11 and 12 in Amartya Sen’s book, the ‘Idea of Justice’ this entry focuses extensively on a discussion of Sen’s ‘capability approach’.
Fundamentally, Sen’s capability approach is an attempt to stem away from defining deprivation solely in terms of financial deficit and focuses instead on establishing the real, underlying causes of poverty. Sen believes that ‘disadvantages’ are often ‘coupled’ together meaning that it is not sufficient to just examine things from a purely financial perspective in terms of improving the welfare of those in need. Although it is evident that financial assistance is required in order for the disadvantaged to achieve what he refers to as specific ‘functionings’, it is not sufficient if long term change is on the agenda. Sen believes that it is essential to examine the links that exist between the different types of disadvantages in order to determine their just causes and to establish their interconnectedness.
Although deprivation affects ability and therefore hinders income earning capacity, poverty results from capability deprivation and not income deprivation as is commonly believed within capitalist government systems. With his capability approach, Sen argues that the income approach to poverty is disproportionate and does not take into consideration; individual heterogeneities, disparities in the physical environment, societal variation and individual perspectives.
The capabilities approach is linked to substantive freedom and values ability over income, focusing on opportunities rather than the means to the opportunities, in other words wealth, resources and utility. However, Sen still remains sceptical about income distribution as a means of rectifying capability deprivation as he believes that it ultimately does not facilitate understanding nor contribute to long term poverty alleviation in tackling the issues behind capability deprivation, what Sen refers to as ‘real poverty’.
Although the capability approach is a viable alternative to the income approach, especially when long term change is on the agenda, it frequently slips short of the mark, notably in terms of its execution. The capability approach is a necessary critique of traditional welfare economics in that poverty isn’t judged by a lack of wealth or resources but by a human inability to achieve valuable functionings. Although the capability approach is clearly superior to the income approach in that it searches for answers by taking into account all aspects of life in determining the real factors for poverty it can also be criticised for being too general. Although Sen is absolutely correct in focusing on functional capabilities as opposed to access to resources in judging advantage, it must also be acknowledged that this approach is not always either usable or preferable as it is often considered to be too multidimensional.
When used in conjunction with each other, both the income approach and the capability apporach have the highest chance at success. Although the capability approach has proven to be groundbreaking, the benefits of the more simple analyses of what constitutes as poverty (for example comparative wealth or income) should not be completely ignored as although financial deprivation is not the only aspect of poverty it still remains its defining feature.
Thursday, May 20, 2010
The Capability Approach as an Idea of Justice
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Pareto by Proxy
The following blog-post is a commentary on Cohen's “Pareto Argument”, from Ch. 2 of his book Rescuing Justice and Equality. Cohen himself is commenting on Brian Barry's account of the Rawlsian principle for inequality, which I shall briefly explain:
Rawls argues that through the use of a “Veil of Ignorance” members of a closed society can determine what principles of justice ought to guide distribution of essential resources. The premise is that said members have a starting point with no knowledge of their role, position, talents or heritage in this society, so they are free from personal conflict of interest or bias towards arbitrary conditions of typical asymmetries in power and wealth. From this original position of no knowledge, individuals would be prompted to establish two basic principles of justice: first, that all members gain access to an equal initial distribution of resources; second, that if there are to exist any inequalities at all, these should only be permitted if it is for the benefit of those worse off.
From the way Barry interprets Rawls, it seems the argument is that it would be irrational to maintain strict equality for the sake of equality when, if given a certain degree of inequality for the talented or fortunate, the worse off would be left in a better position than otherwise, which is a weak pareto effect. Cohen takes this account and frames it as a springboard for inequality. I would object to this perspective on Rawls, presented as if to make this misleading argument in favour of a principle of inequality, and even setting the conditions to argue in favour of a pareto superior state. This is established to uphold his own vision of justice, proposing a third dimension to egalitarian establishment:
If in D1 the talented and the unskilled have the same income, and in D2 the talented would have a proportionally greater income than the unskilled (which would make the skilled inclined to work with more effort) but the unskilled are still better off than in D1, the Rawlsian principle would allow this inequality. However, Cohen argues, if D2 exist, it is in fact possible to establish a third state in which the talented and the unskilled have a greater income than in D1 because if the talented are indeed egalitarian they should not mind working with the necessary effort for all to be better off. Hence, truly commited egalitarians ought not to worry about a pareto effect.
I would argue that the object of inequality in the system is only justified when meant to remedy an already existing condition of inequality, such as positive discrimination, affirmative action, exponential taxation on coefficient of utilities and so on. I do not believe that Rawls would base his principles of equality on a social state plagued by weak pareto schemes, much less pareto superior. In my opinion this is an oversimplified and catered understanding of Rawlsian theory in order to serve as a platform from which Cohen springs his conclusions.