Anderson's Democratic Equality

In this blog post I want to examine two aspects of Elizabeth Anderson’s critique of luck egalitarianism. Firstly, I will argue that Anderson’s claim that compensation due to victims of poor option luck under a luck egalitarian society is demeaning proves too much and as such would apply to her redistribution under a democratic equality.

Anderson claims that “to be compensated for disabilities, ugliness, or lack of intelligence is insulting to the citizen” ( 1999, p20). She hammers the point home with a series of pitiful and condescending letters that a luck egalitarian would have to write announcing to those to benefit due to their disability, stupidity, or ugliness their eligibility for aid. It is unclear however how Anderson may justify the aid deemed legitimate under her “democratic equality” to be more noble then that of luck egalitarianism; aid deemed necessary to ensure that all have effective access to levels of functioning sufficient to fulfil their role as democratic citizen. We cannot simply presume that Anderson’s subjective motives for aid to the disadvantaged are better; they must be shown to be better through structural differences in her society that demonstrate non pitiful or condescending motivations of redistribution. Anderson’s democratic equality justifies redistribution on the basis that “peoples’ claims to redistributed goods are that they are equals, not inferiors, to others” (p29); where someone’s “inferiority” is, for Anderson, the basis of luck egalitarianism’s giving them aid. Anderson only justifies redistribution up to the point that it allows citizens involve themselves in the democratic process, for example by providing education, food, minimum welfare, a vote, etc. But surely, turning Anderson’s critical viewpoint on itself, this is to view someone’s status below which this involvement is achieved as inferior, and to be taken pity on? Anderson might reply that it is because we view each other as equals that we give this aid, but it is for the same reasons the luck egalitarian would give aid in order to avoid distribution accorded by bad brute luck. Neither does Anderson’s democratic equalities seeking to redress “unjust deficiencies in the social order rather than in peoples innate endowments” (p49) make her less immune to her own criticism of condescension. We can only seek to change the structure of society if we recognise a position of inferiority that we look to remedy; the luck egalitarian is no more liable to doing this through a material basis than Anderson’s proposed changes to human arrangements. While Andersons views of where we must redress inequality (in education, input into society) are certainly more politically correct then the luck egalitarians concern about ugly citizens they still fall foul of her own criticisms of luck egalitarianism.

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