In Chapter 7 of Culture & Equality, Brian Barry takes to task those he accuses of ‘abusing’ culture. Specifically, Barry takes aim at three sorts of claim he finds to be pervasive in discussions about multiculturalism or accommodating cultural differences.
The first involves the defence of some particular practice with the claim that ‘it’s part of my culture/tradition/etc.’. Barry points out (rightly in my opinion) that this amounts to little more than a descriptive fact (or ‘anthropological observation’ to use Barry’s term) which carries zero normative weight; just because you have always done something does not mean that you always should. The second claim, which Barry presents as a response to the above objection is that ’to justify a practice it is not necessary to demonstrate that it satisfies some universal criterion of value. All we need say, indeed all we can say, is that simply in forming part of the group’s culture, it is essential to its well-being.’Following on from this, the third claim Barry focuses on is ‘that cultures are of equal value, or at any rate should be presumed or affirmed to be of equal value.’
According to a liberal individualist like Barry, it is people, not cultures, which are of equal value. How then are we to ensure we treat everyone with equal dignity and respect, even if some people embrace cultural practices or beliefs which we find ridiculous, repugnant, or intolerable?
There seem at least three possible approaches we could take: First, we could be compatibilists- we could argue that Barry is correct, but that we can still find room to respect everyone, even while not respecting their ‘cultural baggage’. If we can’t find a credible compromise, if we think Barry’s approach is incompatible with respecting everyone equally, then we have at least two further options: we can reject Barry’s view, or we can reject the necessity of affording all people equal dignity and respect.
What I would like to do here is begin to make a case for the compatibilist, i.e. the position that we can accept Barry’s position while also affording all people with the dignity and respect they deserve. Since this is a blog entry and not an essay, I’m going to simply sketch out what I think a convincing compatibilist argument might look like with a few bullet points.
- First of all, we need to get a handle on what exactly it means to respect someone. We could start with a weak notion of respect as non-interference: I think that tie you’re wearing is hideous, but I will not force you to change it. If I want to respect you in this case, must I refrain from trying to get you to wear something more aesthetically pleasing? Surely not: we argue amongst our friends all the time about books, bands, movies and so on without thinking that we are disrespecting one another. I would suggest that whether or not such interactions end up as disrespectful depends mostly on the language we use and the context of the particular situation (compare “Oh, you didn’t like Avatar? Did you not think it had very impressive special effects?” to “Oh my God, I can’t believe you didn’t like Avatar, you have no taste in cinema whatsoever!”). Maybe we can go even further and suggest that if you really respect me as a person, you will speak up and tell me to change my tie, unless I want to be laughed at.
- Not only are there times when respecting someone may require us to challenge their beliefs (a more serious example might look something like this: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520690,00.html), there are clearly some values and beliefs which merit active disrespect. No reasonable theory of respect could suggest that liberals ought to affirm the value of a belief system and way of life of a virulent theocrat like Fred Phelps, for example. Yet Phelps’s beliefs are clearly far more important to his sense of self than whether or not he wears ugly ties or happened to like Avatar. What seems to qualify Phelps for public disapproval is the extreme nature of his beliefs, so there does not seem to be a blanket immunity on criticism, at least. For a less extreme case, we can go back to the question that was asked in class- can you respect a Muslim person while not approving of his or her religion? Yet if we investigate this, my intuition is that we could make a reasonable argument to say that anything short of conversion to Islam is not affording full and total respect to the beliefs- it may not make much sense to say to a Muslim ‘I believe Islam is right for you but not for me,’ when Islam is, by definition, right for everyone, as the Muslim understands it.
- If we take from 1) that we may have obligations to challenge people’s beliefs, even when these are deeply held and important, and from 2) that we can and do separate individuals from the views they hold (we surely feel we can adequately respect a Muslim without converting), we still need to show that Barry’s view allows us to respect people in the right way. To do this, I would begin by talking about the value of empathy in understanding and ultimately respecting other individuals. Empathy, in my view, is hugely important in achieving any kind of egalitarian outlook – we hold other people to be equal because we see ourselves reflected in them, to an extent. We recognise a common capacity for suffering, common welfare needs, and so on. Part of this process of empathising with others may involve a kind of universalist abstraction to a sort of ‘lowest common denominator’. The Christian recognises the value of faith in his own life, and recognises that the Muslim also values faith (even though it is misplaced, according to the Christian’s beliefs), and comes to empathise with a fellow person of faith. The heterosexual couple see the homosexual couple and recognise a familiar romantic bond between them which is independent of gender, and come to recognise the homosexual relationship as equally valuable, since both are made of the same fundamental ‘stuff’ worthy of respect. Brian Barry sees Iris Marion Young as a passionate and dedicated philosopher, and recognises those features in himself, even though he profoundly disagrees with her conclusions (okay, maybe that last one’s a bit optimistic).
4. If the above works (which is a big IF, I’ll admit) then I think you would have the bones of an argument showing that Barry’s version, or something close to it, allows us to have just the right amount of respect, while avoiding the sorts of problems which may arise if a person’s entire cultural baggage is rendered immune from criticism.
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