Although I initially found myself agreeing with Eva Kittay’s argument, upon further inspection I found it extremely difficult to maintain that same enthusiasm for her writing. Despite agreeing with Kittay on the basis that an egalitarian theory of justice should be fairly distributional, it is essential that we first question what exactly it means to be both ‘free and equal’ and why is it that social cooperation is so necessary for egalitarians?
Freedom and equality are at the heart of egalitarian thought. Egalitarians believe that all people should be treated equally, and this involves a degree of ‘social cooperation’. Although the logistics of this are highly complex and varying it is safe to assume that in egalitarian thought, all human beings are considered free and equal in terms of both status and worth. In Kittay’s article she is predominantly concerned with critiquing Rawls’s theory of social cooperation and believes that his thoughts are insufficient and do not adequately take the position of dependents into consideration. For Kittay, Rawls’s perception of social cooperation is insufficient, i.e. that social cooperation is a necessity as a means to achieving an ends. Kittay does not agree with this as she believes that in order for this to be applicable, all citizens need to be rational and reasonable which she believes cannot possibly be achieved by dependents. Kittay argues that in order for dependents to be considered as citizens, then Rawls’s list of ‘primary goods’ needs to be urgently expanded. Kittay believes that a Rawlsian account of justice is not sufficient in a society where the recognition of dependency is a concrete component of justice.
My thoughts on this are as follows. I believe that Rawls intends his primary goods to be considered as a building block towards social justice and although Kittay feels that they are inadequate, they are still fundamentally egalitarian in that they revolve around the notion of fair and even distribution. Although I agree with Kittay in principle, I think it fundamentally boils down to interpretation issues. If Rawls considers both basic and non basic liberties among his primary goods, then surely Kittay’s argument is indefensible as her concerns over dependency and reciprocity have actually been included by Rawls in his A Theory of Justice? Furthermore, as part of Rawls’s ‘Two Principles of Justice’, he focuses on the fair distribution of the aforementioned primary goods, including the distribution of social welfare. It is here that Kittay’s fears over dependency should be quelled as care, including the care of dependents, is intended by Rawls to be an element of social welfare.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
Equality in Love, Care and Solidarity: A Critique of Eva Kittay's 'Love's Labour'
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4 comments:
According to Kittay, “a definite answer [to the question of whether or not a theory like Rawls’s yields “sufficiently egalitarian outcomes”] rests on the capacity of the chosen principles to accommodate dependency concerns.”
I think the best way to accommodate Kittay’s concerns within a Rawlsian theory is to bring them in under ‘self respect’ which Rawls himself suggests is perhaps the most important primary good. I can’t see how this wouldn’t cover caregivers at the very least, though I think Kittay may have a point when she talks about whether or not permanently dependent people would be denied ‘citizenship’ on Rawls’s account.
I’m in two minds as regards Kittay’s argument; I think she raises some excellent points as regards dominant theories of social justice being centred on a male understanding of justice and fails to address the important role of care giving that is essential to society and predominantly done by women. This is a problem faced by human rights also in the sense that they tend to revolve around concerns between state and individual where in fact women’s concerns the world over are often not on their relationship with the state but that between husbands and fathers. On the other hand Kittay’s insistence that her theory of justice is a female interpretation sits uneasily with me as reifying our current sexual division of labour and giving it a large dose of biological determinacy; although her concerns are for dependents and care givers male and female alike.
I do agree with Kittay though that her concerns cannot be properly addressed by Rawls “Principles of Justice”. As, although carers may be guaranteed minimum levels of primary goods such as self respect and social welfare under Rawls difference principle, and any inequality must be to the advantage of the worst off; the benefits of the worst off are insufficient to compensate the sacrifices made by dependents for carers. Why should carers condemn themselves to the position of worst off for supplying an essential public good? This sets up disincentives to care.
It would be interesting to observe a system dedicated to respond to Kittay's concerns and the generation of labour through welfare+work placement distribution of availablepublic resources. Though I would not consider caregivers to be a core issue in egalitarian debates, and I'd be sceptical to consider those lacking mental capacities to be active part of the demos so long as this state of mind remains, these are indeed maters that ought not be overlooked.
Although I agree that there is a definite lack of female political participation in developing countries, I do not share Kittay's urgency to feminise the issue of social cooperation as personally I find it counterproductive and unegalitarian.
Although politics is certainly a male-dominated arena, I do not believe that this necessarily means that women do not share the same or even similar views of what social justice ought to consist of. Women, especially in developing countries, need to be encouraged into politics in order to weaken the patriarchy that is often in existence.
I feel that Kittay's declaration that her theory is a 'female interpretation' ultimately succeeds in undermining her efforts to address the concerns held and issues faced by carers
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