In Chapter 7 of Culture & Equality, Brian Barry takes to task those he accuses of ‘abusing’ culture. Specifically, Barry takes aim at three sorts of claim he finds to be pervasive in discussions about multiculturalism or accommodating cultural differences.
The first involves the defence of some particular practice with the claim that ‘it’s part of my culture/tradition/etc.’. Barry points out (rightly in my opinion) that this amounts to little more than a descriptive fact (or ‘anthropological observation’ to use Barry’s term) which carries zero normative weight; just because you have always done something does not mean that you always should. The second claim, which Barry presents as a response to the above objection is that ’to justify a practice it is not necessary to demonstrate that it satisfies some universal criterion of value. All we need say, indeed all we can say, is that simply in forming part of the group’s culture, it is essential to its well-being.’Following on from this, the third claim Barry focuses on is ‘that cultures are of equal value, or at any rate should be presumed or affirmed to be of equal value.’
According to a liberal individualist like Barry, it is people, not cultures, which are of equal value. How then are we to ensure we treat everyone with equal dignity and respect, even if some people embrace cultural practices or beliefs which we find ridiculous, repugnant, or intolerable?
There seem at least three possible approaches we could take: First, we could be compatibilists- we could argue that Barry is correct, but that we can still find room to respect everyone, even while not respecting their ‘cultural baggage’. If we can’t find a credible compromise, if we think Barry’s approach is incompatible with respecting everyone equally, then we have at least two further options: we can reject Barry’s view, or we can reject the necessity of affording all people equal dignity and respect.
What I would like to do here is begin to make a case for the compatibilist, i.e. the position that we can accept Barry’s position while also affording all people with the dignity and respect they deserve. Since this is a blog entry and not an essay, I’m going to simply sketch out what I think a convincing compatibilist argument might look like with a few bullet points.
- First of all, we need to get a handle on what exactly it means to respect someone. We could start with a weak notion of respect as non-interference: I think that tie you’re wearing is hideous, but I will not force you to change it. If I want to respect you in this case, must I refrain from trying to get you to wear something more aesthetically pleasing? Surely not: we argue amongst our friends all the time about books, bands, movies and so on without thinking that we are disrespecting one another. I would suggest that whether or not such interactions end up as disrespectful depends mostly on the language we use and the context of the particular situation (compare “Oh, you didn’t like Avatar? Did you not think it had very impressive special effects?” to “Oh my God, I can’t believe you didn’t like Avatar, you have no taste in cinema whatsoever!”). Maybe we can go even further and suggest that if you really respect me as a person, you will speak up and tell me to change my tie, unless I want to be laughed at.
- Not only are there times when respecting someone may require us to challenge their beliefs (a more serious example might look something like this: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,520690,00.html), there are clearly some values and beliefs which merit active disrespect. No reasonable theory of respect could suggest that liberals ought to affirm the value of a belief system and way of life of a virulent theocrat like Fred Phelps, for example. Yet Phelps’s beliefs are clearly far more important to his sense of self than whether or not he wears ugly ties or happened to like Avatar. What seems to qualify Phelps for public disapproval is the extreme nature of his beliefs, so there does not seem to be a blanket immunity on criticism, at least. For a less extreme case, we can go back to the question that was asked in class- can you respect a Muslim person while not approving of his or her religion? Yet if we investigate this, my intuition is that we could make a reasonable argument to say that anything short of conversion to Islam is not affording full and total respect to the beliefs- it may not make much sense to say to a Muslim ‘I believe Islam is right for you but not for me,’ when Islam is, by definition, right for everyone, as the Muslim understands it.
- If we take from 1) that we may have obligations to challenge people’s beliefs, even when these are deeply held and important, and from 2) that we can and do separate individuals from the views they hold (we surely feel we can adequately respect a Muslim without converting), we still need to show that Barry’s view allows us to respect people in the right way. To do this, I would begin by talking about the value of empathy in understanding and ultimately respecting other individuals. Empathy, in my view, is hugely important in achieving any kind of egalitarian outlook – we hold other people to be equal because we see ourselves reflected in them, to an extent. We recognise a common capacity for suffering, common welfare needs, and so on. Part of this process of empathising with others may involve a kind of universalist abstraction to a sort of ‘lowest common denominator’. The Christian recognises the value of faith in his own life, and recognises that the Muslim also values faith (even though it is misplaced, according to the Christian’s beliefs), and comes to empathise with a fellow person of faith. The heterosexual couple see the homosexual couple and recognise a familiar romantic bond between them which is independent of gender, and come to recognise the homosexual relationship as equally valuable, since both are made of the same fundamental ‘stuff’ worthy of respect. Brian Barry sees Iris Marion Young as a passionate and dedicated philosopher, and recognises those features in himself, even though he profoundly disagrees with her conclusions (okay, maybe that last one’s a bit optimistic).
4. If the above works (which is a big IF, I’ll admit) then I think you would have the bones of an argument showing that Barry’s version, or something close to it, allows us to have just the right amount of respect, while avoiding the sorts of problems which may arise if a person’s entire cultural baggage is rendered immune from criticism.
6 comments:
P.S. "According to a liberal individualist like Barry, it is people, not cultures, which are of equal value." - is not intended to imply that non-individualists don't care about people or view them as fundamentally equal.
First off, I can say I broadly agree with Brian’s post as regards the issue of respect and the individual. He has shown clearly in my opinion how one can respect the individual without respecting their chosen culture or lifestyle. I would like to however talk briefly however on the subject of Barry’s disdain for group affirmation, i.e the public policy of celebrating aspects of a group’s identity.
Barry looks to achieve equality through “common legal status as citizen” and that this should be “ideally translated into an equal treatment in everyday transaction” (2001, p269). But “everyday transactions” seems to me an arbitrary measure to equalise. It includes for Barry, I presume, employment rights, making it illegal to employ only those of a certain group, to laws as regards provision of services such as sitting at the front of the bus instead of the back, as was a an issue for black civil rights activists in America in the 1960’s. But this leaves a large area of other “everyday transactions” open to individual discrimination on the basis of his or her culture, which can be as ill liberal as one pleases. A good example would be the case of the power relations held by a working husband over his wife and children in a single earner household. This husband may decide to send only his male children to college or may demand of his wife that she wear the hijab outside the home. It would seem to me that Barry would not seek to equalise these everyday transactions through liberal legal measures, indeed it would seem impossible. (Although in France they are taking increasingly aggressive measures against the Hijab it is debatable how liberal or otherwise this might be). Some sort of group affirmation for liberal ends would seem necessary in the liberal egalitarian society therefore. This group affirmation would not seek to affirm all groups or cultures but ones deemed to be suffering under illiberal practices that are not subject to regulation by the law in a liberal society. Barry might reply that it is impossible to force a change of opinion on someone who has an illiberal disdain for members of certain groups. This is true; however we don’t stop arguing liberal principles because of it. Barry might also reply that such a campaign to equalise women’s place in the attitude of sexist men is at base level only affirming the individual unless one was to affirm a whole cultural way of life that came with that group as well. It would seem to be however that more is being affirmed then the rights of the individual as what we are talking of are the rights of certain groups of individuals to equal recognition. Some level of group affirmation, that does not necessarily involve cultural celebration of certain groups traits and characteristics, for me therefore is warranted.
(I don't know whether I'm supposed to reply or not, I just thought we could get a discussion going regardless...)
“Barry might also reply that such a campaign to equalise women’s place in the attitude of sexist men is at base level only affirming the individual unless one was to affirm a whole cultural way of life that came with that group as well.”
I suspect that this is indeed the sort of approach Barry would opt for in response to your criticism. I don’t want to put words in his mouth though, so here are my own thoughts on it. In particular, a lot hinges on this part, I think:
“It would seem to be however that more is being affirmed then the rights of the individual as what we are talking of are the rights of certain groups of individuals to equal recognition.”
I think the first thing the liberal individualist has to do is to acknowledge that the empirical evidence is that marginalised groups do exist. These are easier to identify if we have laws which explicitly discriminate against groups (and we have plenty of examples of these, usually to do with race, gender, ethnicity or sexual orientation). Additionally the individualist must also acknowledge what seems to me to be the highly plausible account of oppression given by Young, which describes oppression which runs deeper throughout society and cannot be erased by mere legislation.
It seems to me that the problem for the liberal individualist is that he needs to have the conceptual tools and vocabulary necessary for dealing with the reality of these oppressed groups, while maintaining his commitment to individualism. I think that challenge can be met, without resorting to ‘group affirmation’, or at the very least, by recasting some form of group affirmation in universal, individualistic terms.
To take the case of the woman wearing the hijab, what are we really saying to her, if we urge her to disobey the orders of her husband and cast off the oppressive veil? Are we telling her that because she is a woman, she has a right not to be treated as inferior? Or are we telling her that because she is a person, she has a right not to be treated as inferior? What more can be affirmed beyond that?
Finally, I would also suggest that Barry’s focus on common legal status and ‘everyday transactions’ between citizens is not arbitrary, but rather follows from the Harm Principle in the sense that Barry is thinking in terms of the legitimate use of state coercion and so considers personal opinions and beliefs as being essentially out of bounds, at least from the perspective of the state. This could be looked at as a failing on his part, since it ignores the other dimensions of oppression like that ones Young talks about, but it might also be fair to say that Barry, like many political philosophers is simply concerned with the workings of the state, rather than the attitudes of the society as a whole. (You could say that the two are inextricably linked, though Barry does point out that social change has often followed, rather than preceded progressive legislation. We could look to the case of Loving V. Virginia for example, or the various states in the US which have legalised gay marriage through the courts or the legislatures. )
I think Barry has had very limited multicultural interactions, and seems swift to dismiss the importance cultural practices have to certain ethnic groups. I do believe in the right, and even duty, to question practices that would contravene individual freedoms. This said, there are practices that may seem wrong or immoral but form part of a world view that defines the identity of certain groups of individuals, and that ought to try and be analysed from beyond the deeply occidental veil by which we are covered as part of our own culture. Being liberal theorists does not place us above faults of subjectivity. So in this sense I do concur that a minimal common denominator ought to be found, but I would be wary to become entangled in these debates when determining foundations of egalitarian theory; in this case I would advocate for respecting autonomy of cultural groups so long as there is a minimal set of superseding moral rights. For instance, language is a crucial cultural trait, and minority groups such as Indigenous peoples of Mexico (who amount to 10% of the population) need special consideration for their culture in order to be enabled for any attempt at egalitarian welfare from the State. There are close to 70 indigenous tongues only in Mexico, and as a believer of egalitarianism, I believe the State has the obligation provide adequate institutional aid for each case (ranging from legal protection to education), even if it would be all the more simple and far less expensive to just homogenise them (which has been tried before) into the Spanish speaking mainstream, even if perhaps this way more resources could be allocated to general welfare. Thus, I believe cultural traits can and must be accommodated into the social calculations for effective empowerment through an accurate and objective mechanism or criterion for legitimate concerns.
I think you're absolutely correct when you point out that disagreement does not necessarily equate to disrespect, despite the two terms often being used interchangeably. It is impossible for humans to agree on everything and (within reason) disagreement is often encouraged among peer groups. Today, we live in a very globalised age which means that cultural diversity is evident in almost all aspects of life. Society is no longer homogenised and all individuals are entitled to a personal cultural identity and to practice traditions how they please.
I disagree with Barry that it ought to be people who are regarded as equal, not their cultures as I believe that all cultures deserve respect even if we do not necessarily agree with their principles. There is a definite need for the term 'respect' to be more accurately defined, for example, is respect turning a blind eye to something unfamiliar and allowing individuals to practice traditions, religions etc, without interference or encouragement to the contrary? Or is it considered socially respectful to encourage people to change their views into something more malleable and socially coherent? In order for the concept of respect to be fully recognised then freedom of speech must also be adhered to. Respect is only possible with knowledge and in order to become knowledgeable then information must be made readily available to clarify any cultural misconceptions that might arise.
@Oscar – As I see it, there’s a delicate balance which needs to be struck between recognising our own prejudices as “embedded” individuals on the one hand, i.e. recognising that we are not disembodied perfectly objective observers, and resisting the spectre of cultural relativism which some commentators and legislators can slip into when discussing particular cases.
There was a famous debate between Habermas and Gadamer as to whether prejudices can ultimately be overcome or whether attempting to do so exhibits merely a ‘prejudice against prejudices’. I tend to think that if prejudices can be overcome then we can find a point from which to criticise other cultural practises, and if they can’t, then the relativist critique doesn’t succeed anyway since it ends up being circular. (to put it crudely, if criticising people for aspects of their culture is wrong, then you can’t criticise me for criticising if criticism of other cultures is part of my culture.)
With that said, I think you are right when you suggest that the solution is to respect cultural autonomy with a minimum standard of rights. (though I would probably prefer that quite a restrictive standard be applied.) In terms of linguistic rights and obligations, I think that language plays such an important functional as well as cultural role that facilities need to be provided for people who want to speak the language (as opposed to artificially supporting a language for its own sake, as I would argue is what happens in Ireland with the Irish language*.)
*which is not to suggest that there is not a sizeable minority of people who do genuinely want to keep Irish alive, in which case I think they can and should be accommodated.
@Marian –
I think I would suggest that when we speak of ‘respect’ for a culture, what we really mean (or what we ought to mean, at least) is that we can appreciate that cultures are important to people. On a view like this, cultures are valued only in terms of the value they might have for individuals, not for anything intrinsic to the culture itself. Since individuals are the ultimate source of value, this allows us to override cultural practises which undermine or damage a commitment to individual freedoms for all (in particular for minorities and especially for minorities within minorities).
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