In this blog post I want to examine two aspects of Elizabeth Anderson’s critique of luck egalitarianism. Firstly, I will argue that Anderson’s claim that compensation due to victims of poor option luck under a luck egalitarian society is demeaning proves too much and as such would apply to her redistribution under a democratic equality.
Anderson claims that “to be compensated for disabilities, ugliness, or lack of intelligence is insulting to the citizen” ( 1999, p20). She hammers the point home with a series of pitiful and condescending letters that a luck egalitarian would have to write announcing to those to benefit due to their disability, stupidity, or ugliness their eligibility for aid. It is unclear however how Anderson may justify the aid deemed legitimate under her “democratic equality” to be more noble then that of luck egalitarianism; aid deemed necessary to ensure that all have effective access to levels of functioning sufficient to fulfil their role as democratic citizen. We cannot simply presume that Anderson’s subjective motives for aid to the disadvantaged are better; they must be shown to be better through structural differences in her society that demonstrate non pitiful or condescending motivations of redistribution. Anderson’s democratic equality justifies redistribution on the basis that “peoples’ claims to redistributed goods are that they are equals, not inferiors, to others” (p29); where someone’s “inferiority” is, for Anderson, the basis of luck egalitarianism’s giving them aid. Anderson only justifies redistribution up to the point that it allows citizens involve themselves in the democratic process, for example by providing education, food, minimum welfare, a vote, etc. But surely, turning Anderson’s critical viewpoint on itself, this is to view someone’s status below which this involvement is achieved as inferior, and to be taken pity on? Anderson might reply that it is because we view each other as equals that we give this aid, but it is for the same reasons the luck egalitarian would give aid in order to avoid distribution accorded by bad brute luck. Neither does Anderson’s democratic equalities seeking to redress “unjust deficiencies in the social order rather than in peoples innate endowments” (p49) make her less immune to her own criticism of condescension. We can only seek to change the structure of society if we recognise a position of inferiority that we look to remedy; the luck egalitarian is no more liable to doing this through a material basis than Anderson’s proposed changes to human arrangements. While Andersons views of where we must redress inequality (in education, input into society) are certainly more politically correct then the luck egalitarians concern about ugly citizens they still fall foul of her own criticisms of luck egalitarianism.
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Anderson's Democratic Equality
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4 comments:
(Just some initial thoughts, I might have more later as my 'official' reply)
As far as I can see, your criticism here could have different sorts of implications, depending on what theoretical direction you want to go.
So to summarise where we are: we have luck egalitarians in one corner, and Anderson’s ‘Democratic Equality’ in the other. Then we have Anderson’s particular criticism of luck egalitarians which you’ve outlined here, and your claim that Anderson’s position suffers from the same deficiency. All I’d like to do here is point out what I think the possible options are, assuming your criticism and Anderson’s are both correct.
One possibility is that both luck egalitarians and Anderson suffer from the same deficiency and so a third theory needs to be developed, either because this particular criticism highlights a fatal flaw neither Anderson nor luck egalitarians can handle, or because it forms part of a larger collection of problems which taken together, mean that neither view is worth hanging on to.
A second possibility is that either Anderson or luck egalitarians (or both) can modify their views to accommodate this problem and move forward with the core theory intact. If you are right and Anderson is as vulnerable here as the luck egalitarians, then my intuition would be that the solution to one would probably be similar if not identical to the solution for the other side.
A third possibility (and the one to which I’m most inclined) is that your criticism of Anderson demonstrates that her criticism of the luck egalitarians (phew!) is not really something which needs to cause too much worry to luck egalitarians in the first place (or, by implication, to Anderson either). This particular line of criticism seems more to do with how a particular (luck egalitarian) system might be implemented, rather than whether the motivating forces behind it are right or not. Is it really a damaging criticism to suggest that some people might be offended at being offered assistance? Is it realistic to expect a system whereby someone might not take offence, or where the authorities might not always phrase their concern in the right way?
Perhaps I see your shabby clothes and think to offer you some money to buy new clothes but this greatly offends you as you have been going for a particularly grungy style. Is my heart not still in the right place? Rather than take offence, can you not politely correct me and suggest I be more open minded in future about people’s sartorial preferences?
Ultimately Anderson’s criticism (and your criticism of Anderson) seems to me to be more useful as a general reminder that we must be careful about how we offer assistance, such that we properly express the spirit in which it is offered. I don’t accept for a minute that this cannot be achieved in a way that makes it clear that what is being offered is help from equals to equals.
I can see where Anderson’s criticisms are coming from, notably in terms of the limitedness or vagueness that is sometimes attributed to luck egalitarianism, particularly when Anderson refers to luck egalitarianism as embodying a ‘flawed understanding’ of equality.
Although I feel that a fair and equal distribution of goods and resources is necessary, it is, as Anderson says, only a ‘narrow understanding’ of equality. The preoccupation of fair distribution neglects the bigger political picture and can undermine political movements aiming to create real and long term societal change for all individuals, regardless of whether their bad luck has resulted from un-chosen circumstances or simply from poor decision making.
Fundamentally I think that the very notion of ‘brute luck’ needs to be addressed. Personally, I find the concept to be counter-productive and believe that a strong social welfare system needs to be available to all citizens, even when the bad luck in question is not in the form of ‘brute luck’. Justice through luck egalitarianism aims to minimise the effects that ‘brute luck’ has on the lives of citizens which suggests that inequalities are permissible if they occur as a result of conscious choices or deliberate acts. Anderson recognises this and believes that her concept of ‘democratic equality’ is a politically viable alternative to the shortcomings she associates with luck egalitarianism. In her eyes, democratic equality is non-judgmental and sees the construction of a community based around equality, fair distribution and respect. Democratic equality ensures that all citizens have equal and effective access to adequate social conditions and are fundamentally free and democratically equal to use their share of ‘opportunities’ however way they choose. What essentially sets Anderson’s ‘democratic equality’ apart from ‘luck egalitarianism’ is that there will be no negative judgement in the event that any decisions made reach an unfortunate outcome.
Even though I agree with Brian's comments on the most part, I cannot but feel more sympathy for Anderson on this account. In essence, as Kevin has accurately pointed out, the mechanics of the theory are the same, though the criterion of selection and distribution of aid may have shifted. On both accounts, individuals are compensated for inequalities beyond their control. This is how I side with Anderson, for her guidelines are -I would say- more legitimate claims in a liberal democracy. Structural violence is by far a better argument for redistribution than the size of one's ears or crookedness of a nose. Such a difference in basis does seem relevant in the aftermath, for Anderson speaks of individual empowerment and enabling of citizens, whereas mainstream luck egalitarians lean towards more of a 'compensation' paradigm.
On Brian’s points on my post I agree with his final conclusion. I believe that both Anderson’s scheme and luck egalitarianism can stand up to Anderson’s own criticism of condescension. But on review I believe Anderson may have a strong point as regards the motivation of one’s aid to another individual. Take for example aid given by charities or missionaries to Africa. In the past this aid was wrapped up in a semi-colonial means of thinking that sought to “save the black babies”. One is reminded of Mills view that colonial intervention could be justified to save “barbarian” people from themselves. Today an aspect of this thinking, especially in relation to Africa, remains. We view aid given on such terms with disdain.
However, I’m not sure if Anderson demonstrates the same level of condescension within luck egalitarianism. Take for example the issue of “ugliness” addressed by Anderson. Today we provide for the removal of such things as birth marks on babies and also for braces within the public health system. From my experience those who have benefited from this have only ever expressed gratitude to a national health service that provides for it. In this sense I disagree with Oscar that “empowerment” is more legitimate then “compensation” in all cases in a liberal democracy, though in many issues it may be.
I agree with Marian and Anderson that a fundamental flaw in luck egalitarianism is that it may allow for the destitution of individuals as a result of conscious decision made by the individual. A well functioning democracy must provide for the minimum standard of living necessary for basic participation among society.
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